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The imagination has traditionally been associated with unreality and 
is commonly thought to be the antithesis of reason. This is a notion of 
imagination that can be found in Plato’s writing and has influenced 
modern Western epistemology and educational ideals. As such, tradi-
tional schooling, which has focused on the cultivation of reason and 
the accumulation of facts, has devalued the imagination and frequently 
encouraged children to transcend their imaginative natures.  In this 
paper, I draw on the work of John Dewey to explain how imagination 
is not opposed to thinking. Nor is the imagination a distinct form of 
thinking. I argue that it is actually integral to all thinking and, as such, 
is essential for living a meaningful life.  I then argue that one of Phi-
losophy for Children’s strengths is that its pedagogy and curriculum 
content are ideal for facilitating this Deweyian ideal of imagination 
and, thus, reflective thinking and meaningful learning.  
Kieran Egan states that imagination “is a concept that has come down to us with a 
history of suspicion and mistrust” (2007, p. 4). Like experience and the emotions, the 
imagination is frequently thought to be an obstacle to reason. While reason is con-
ceived of as an abstract, objective and rule-governed method of delivering absolute 
truths, the imagination is considered “unconstrained, arbitrary, and fanciful,” as 
well as “particular, subjective, and idiosyncratic” (Jo 2002, p. 39).  This negative view 
of the imagination can be traced back at least as far as Plato, and it is still evident in 
contemporary educational ideas and practices. Dominant approaches to schooling 
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emphasize the accumulation of facts and the cultivation of reasoning rather than the 
development of imagination (Nussbaum, 2010; Egan & Judson, 2009; Egan, 2007; 
Haralambous, Fitzgerald, & Nielsen, 2007; Kennedy 2006; Greene 1995; Dewey 
1997). At best, the imagination is conventionally seen as a valuable capacity that is 
entirely distinct from reason and is primarily cultivated in “the arts.”  
In this article I draw on John Dewey’s theory of inquiry to argue that the 
imagination is not an obstacle to reason, nor merely a valuable and distinct capac-
ity, but rather an integral element of all thinking. I refer to this Deweyan notion of 
imagination as the “intelligent imagination” to distinguish it from other accounts, 
as well as from fantasy and reverie. I argue that all schooling must cultivate the 
imagination as a basic, interdisciplinary capability and that integrating philosophy 
into the curriculum—particularly the Philosophy for Children approach to teach-
ing philosophy—is one way that schools may make some progress towards achiev-
ing this goal. Originally developed by Matthew Lipman and Ann Margaret Sharp, 
Philosophy for Children (P4C) integrates the methods and content of philosophy 
and the pragmatist idea of a Community of Inquiry in order to teach critical, cre-
ative, caring, and communal thinking skills, as well as the attitudes necessary for 
life in a democracy. A typical P4C class involves the shared reading of a narrative, 
containing philosophically puzzling ideas, followed by a classroom dialogue ini-
tiated by student questions and responses to the text. Through formulating ques-
tions, articulating problems, defining concepts, constructing solutions, express-
ing opinions, providing reasons and evidence, constructing criteria, searching for 
counter examples and evaluating arguments and ideas, students aim to reconstruct 
philosophical problems and, in so doing, make sense of their world. This process 
necessitates, as well as scaffolds, the development of the intelligent imagination.
The Platonic View of the Imagination 
Considering the significant influence Plato’s ideas have had on Western notions of 
truth, knowledge, reason, reality, and education, it is not surprising that some of 
his negative comments about the imagination are reflected in contemporary ap-
proaches to schooling. For Plato, reason and philosophy give us access to reality and 
absolute truth, while the imagination and art are associated with sense experience, 
the emotions and unreality. Plato conceives of ultimate reality as the nonphysical, 
transcendental realm of the Forms, which are abstract concepts.  The physical world 
of sense experience is not genuine reality, but merely a copy. Images are copies of 
the physical world, filtered through the interests, emotions and restricted embod-
ied perspectives of those who create them (Plato, 1998, para. 598b). Thus, for Plato, 
what is imagined is three degrees away from reality.  To explain this idea Plato 
provides the example of a bed. There is the Form of bed, which is an abstract idea 
or concept. This is the real bed. Then there are the physical beds that we sleep on, 
created by craftsman to partake in the Form of bed. Thus, these concrete beds are 
only copies of the Form of bed. Then finally there are images of beds. These images, 
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such as paintings of beds, are mere copies of concrete beds. That is, they are copies 
of copies of reality (Plato, 1998, para. 597b-597e). This conceptualization applies to 
the images in dreams, poetry, myths, music, and rhetoric, as much as to the images 
created by painters and sculptures.  
Plato’s concern with the imagination is not just that images are unreal, but 
that we may mistake the images for reality, like the prisoners in Plato’s cave who 
believe the shadows on the wall are real and, consequently, never learn the truth 
about their world. Even when an escaped and enlightened prisoner returns to in-
form the other prisoners that reality is actually outside the cave, the prisoners are 
mostly unable to accept that there could be anything more real than the shadows 
on the wall (Plato, 1998, para, 514a-518b). This is particularly concerning for Plato, 
given the imagination’s capacity to construct very seductive images of reality, just 
as artists often represent the world in a idealized or beautified manner. This is why 
Plato associates painting, poetry, sculpture, and music with the rhetoric practiced 
by the sophists, which he describes as an immoral activity aimed at deception. An 
individual who is deluded about her own nature and abilities and the world around 
her is unlikely to live a happy life or be a productive member of society. Such a per-
son is likely to ignore “real” problems and potential dangers and instead devote 
herself to the pursuit of unachievable ends. 
While Plato is more frequently associated with this negative view of the imagi-
nation (e.g., Egan, 2007; Fesmire, 2003), he does not entirely condemn the imagi-
nation or the arts (e.g., Bundy, 1922; Thayer, 1977). The imagination is included on 
Plato’s divided line, which represents four stages of human understanding (Plato, 
1998, para. 509c-511e). The line is first divided into two parts, with one part repre-
senting the visible realm of material objects, and the other representing the intel-
ligible realm of the Forms. The visible realm is further divided into two parts, with 
one part representing opinion or belief and the other representing imagination and 
conjecture. While the imagination is included in the stages of human understand-
ing, it is still associated with the subjective senses, and thus relegated to a status 
lower than mere opinion. However, Bundy argues that the section of the line rep-
resenting the intelligible realm also includes imagination (1922, pp. 368-369). The 
intelligible realm is also divided into two parts; the first part is called understanding 
while the other, superior part, is called dialectic. In the stage called “understanding” 
one uses images of physical objects in order to understand the Form of the thing 
being contemplated. For example, a mathematician will use a mental image of a 
triangular shaped object in order to theorize about the Form of triangularity. This 
stage seems to correspond with science in that it involves hypothesizing, general-
izing and theorizing about the material world. Thus, Plato may actually suggest two 
notions of the imagination, one perceptual and the other intelligible (Bundy, 1922, 
pp. 368-369). However, even on this reading, the imagination is still distinct from, 
and subordinate to, pure reason or dialectic, the highest stage of understanding, 
which is not dependent on either perception or imagination.  As such, imagination 
also remains a potential obstacle to reason. 
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Since Plato believed the imagination could be a powerful force that leads 
us astray, he also thought education should help individuals overcome or control 
their imaginations. However, in accordance with his divided line metaphor, Plato 
suggested that the imagination, controlled by reason, had some educational value. 
Carefully created stories and music played an important role in Plato’s theory of 
primary education (1998, para. 376e-392e, 401b-403c). The later years of schooling, 
which were to be limited to those who would perform the more important protec-
tive and leadership roles in society, were to be largely devoted to mathematics and 
philosophy in order to develop the faculty of reason, which remained the ultimate 
goal of education.
The notion of the imagination as the potentially seductive antithesis of rea-
son is reflected in many modern beliefs about the nature of reason, knowledge, and 
learning.  While not all philosophers have put forward negative views of the imagi-
nation, they have largely tended to ignore, sideline, or be wary of the imagination. 
As Egan (2007) explains, even those who suggest that the imagination plays some 
fundamental role in human understanding have expressed uncertainty about its 
nature and value (e.g., Hume and Kant).  As such, the imagination is predominantly 
considered to be mysterious and potentially problematic, if not outright dangerous. 
Dewey’s Theory of the Imagination 
Dewey is one of the few philosophers who unambiguously emphasizes the fun-
damental interrelatedness of the imagination and thinking. However, as Steven 
Fesmire points out, Dewey’s account of the imagination has been largely ignored, 
even by Dewey scholars (2003, p. 64). This is probably because his comments on 
the imagination are scattered throughout his immense body of work rather than 
explained in one comprehensive piece of writing. Dewey describes several roles 
that the imagination plays in the process of inquiry: conceiving of alternatives to 
problematic situations or “ends-in-view”; suggesting means to reach those ends; 
evaluating those means through considering their possible consequences if applied 
(what Dewey calls reasoning); making use of past experience; fostering sympathetic 
or moral imagination; and enabling dialogue and communal inquiry. This section 
will provide an explanation of each of these functions of the intelligent imagination. 
Dewey rejects the Platonic notion of an entirely nonphysical, abstract realm 
of ideas. Thus, thinking is not conceived of as some disembodied, transcendental 
method of acquiring absolute truths. For Dewey, thinking is reflective experience. 
It is the reconstruction of problematic, unsettled, or fragmented experiences into 
coherent, meaningful situations. Problematic experiences occur when our habit-
ual way of interacting with our environment becomes ineffective in satisfying our 
needs and interests. Consequently, thinking emerges as the means to readjusting 
and coordinating ourselves and our environment so that we can survive and grow. 
The imagination plays a fundamental role because it enables us to go beyond ac-
tual experience and imagine situations as other than they are. Thus, we are able to 
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imagine fragmented, incomplete situations as coherent, meaningful wholes.  With-
out this capacity, we would simply have to accept the status quo and there would 
be no need for thinking. Although he is also referring to fancy and reverie, Dewey 
suggests the problem solving function of the imagination in the following passage:
The things most emphasized in imagination as it reshapes experience are 
things which are absent in reality. In the degree in which life is placid and 
easy, imagination is sluggish and bovine. In the degree in which life is 
uneasy and troubled, fancy is stirred to frame pictures of a contrary state 
of things.  By reading the characteristic features of any man’s castles in 
the air you can make a shrewd guess as to his underlying desires which 
are frustrated. What is difficulty and disappointment in real life becomes 
conspicuous achievement and triumph in reverie; what is negative in fact 
will be positive in the image drawn by fancy; what is vexation in conduct 
will be compensated for in high relief in idealizing imagination. (Dewey, 
2004b, p. 60)   
The imagined possibilities for the problematic situation are the desired “ends 
in view” that give inquiry a goal, purpose, framework, and direction.  Through in-
quiry we consider means to actualize these imagined possibilities.  These means are 
also imagined because they are yet to be actualized. They suggest future possible ac-
tion.  Until these means have actually reconstructed the problematic situation as in-
tended, they are only tentative solutions, or what Dewey calls “ideas” (Dewey, 2004a, 
p. 152; 1997, p. 75). “Hypothesizing,” “speculating,” “conjecturing,” and “suggesting” 
are some of the other words that Dewey uses to describe this imaginative process 
of creating possible means for reconstructing experience.  When these ideas have 
been actualized they are called facts, truths, knowledge, or warranted assertions. 
For Dewey, ideas and suggestions are not imaginative just because they go 
beyond what is immediately given in experience. An imaginative idea is one that 
we expect to be realized (1997, p. 7). Dewey distinguishes between imagination 
on the one hand and fancy or reverie on the other. The latter are concerned with 
thoughts that have little or no possibility of realization and are thus unlikely to 
assist in reconstructing experience (Dewey, 1958a, pp. 267-269, 273; 1967, pp. 170-
171). He states that, unlike the imagination, the thoughts entertained in reverie do 
not “aim at knowledge, at belief about facts or in truths” (Dewey, 1997, p. 3). Robin 
Barrow describes a similar notion of imagination, stating that imaginative ideas 
are not just original but also effective in that they are “conducive to a good solution 
to, or resolution of, the task or problem at hand” (1988, p. 85). When Plato talks 
about the imagination leading us away from reality and truth, he seems to have in 
mind what Dewey calls fancy or reverie. Dewey would probably agree that reverie 
has this potential but, unlike Plato, he clearly distinguishes between reverie and 
the imagination. The primary function of the later, for Dewey, is actually to help 
us understand and transform reality.  As Dewey states, “the healthy imagination 
deals not with the unreal, but with the mental realization of what is suggested. Its 
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exercise is not a flight into the purely fanciful and ideal, but a method of expanding 
and filling in what is real” (1997, pp. 166).  
Dewey’s notion of intelligent imagination is somewhat similar to the capacity 
represented on the third section of Plato’s divided line, which Plato calls “under-
standing.” As we have seen, Plato’s notion of understanding resembles scientific in-
quiry in that it involves hypothesizing about the physical world. This was the other 
stage of Plato’s epistemology that Bundy thought involved imagination (1922, pp. 
368-369). This suggests that Dewey and Plato had a similar understanding of at least 
one of the functions of imagination—conjecturing, hypothesizing, making sugges-
tions about the physical world. However, their different metaphysical and epistemo-
logical beliefs lead them to disagree about the value of this notion of imagination. 
Since he rejects the notion of a nonphysical realm, Dewey also rejects the notion of 
pure reason represented by the fourth section of Plato’s divided line.  For Dewey, 
there is no type of thinking or means of human understanding that supersedes the 
imagination and experience. Dewey would believe that the processes represented in 
the first, second, and third sections of the divided line were the only possible means 
of human understanding. (Dewey would also disagree with the way Plato divides 
these processes up and defines them). Since Dewey believed that all modes of hu-
man understanding were experiential and imaginative, the imagination occupies 
a much more fundamental, and less ambiguous, position in his epistemology than 
it does it Plato’s idealist theory.  
While Dewey rejects Plato’s notion of transcendental reason, he believes that 
a different notion of reasoning plays an important role in inquiry. This notion of 
reason is also experiential and imaginative. Dewey specifically reserves the term 
“reasoning” for the process of critically evaluating the means that are suggested 
for reconstructing experience. We don’t simply enact every means suggested for 
achieving our ends in view. This would be inefficient and even dangerous. We 
must carefully evaluate all suggested means prior to acting on them. Dewey dis-
tinguishes between suggestions and conjectures on the one hand, which are more 
immediate and vague, and ideas on the other, which have been subject to careful 
critical examination and, as such, are more likely to be effective and unproblematic 
if applied. According to Dewey, we critically examine suggestions and conjectures 
by inferring what consequences would likely follow from them if they were actual-
ized. It is this process of making inferences that Dewey calls reasoning (1997, pp. 
75-76; 1938, pp. 110-112). Thus, reasoning involves considering whether a sugges-
tion is likely to reconstruct the problematic situation as intended and if it could 
result in any undesirable consequences. A useful example of the reasoning process 
is provided by Dewey. A man returns home to find his house ransacked, and two 
possible explanations are immediately suggested: either he has been burgled or his 
children have made a mess, as they often do. Before acting on either suggestion, he 
considers the implications of having been burgled as opposed to the children hav-
ing made a mess. One implication is that if he has been burgled, certain valuable 
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items will be missing.  This possibility suggests further observations to be made, 
namely that he check to see if the items are in fact missing. From the fact that they 
are missing,  the man infers that the suggestion that he has been burgled is more 
likely true (Dewey, 1997, pp. 82-83). Reasoning is also an imaginative process be-
cause it involves imagining the consequences of suggestions if they were applied. 
These consequences go beyond experience. This is why Dewey states that “inference 
is always an invasion of the unknown, a leap from the known” (2004a, p. 152). Even 
if we don’t accept Dewey’s stipulative definition of reasoning, it seems obvious that 
all reasoning is an imaginative activity because all reasoning involves going beyond 
immediate experience so as to make various connections. 
The imagination doesn’t just enable us to bring to mind future possibilities; it 
also enables us to make use of past experiences  (Dewey, 1967, p. 169; Dewey, 1991, 
p. 106). Our past experiences are also essential components of inquiry because they 
suggest alternative possibilities, as well as means for bringing about these possibili-
ties. If a problematic situation is completely unfamiliar to us, if we have no relevant 
prior knowledge to help us make sense of it, we will be unable to meaningfully re-
construct it. For example, Dewey’s burglary victim draws on his prior knowledge 
of burglaries to infer that the hypothesis that he has been burgled is likely to be 
accurate (Dewey 1958a, p. 272).
The imagination also enables moral reasoning, which, for Dewey, is another 
essential attribute of all thinking.  Ethics is one area where the imagination has 
gained significant attention because of its obvious connection to empathy (e.g., 
Nussbaum, 2010; Kirkman, 2009; Glover, 1999; Greene, 1995; Johnson, 1993).  Em-
pathy involves imagining alternative perspectives, how other people might feel and 
what their desires, needs and interests may be. The empathetic or moral imagina-
tion is particularly important for understanding, and interacting with, those most 
different from us. It is essential for communal life because it enables an awareness 
of other individuals, including past and future individuals, even in their physical 
absence. Such awareness gives rise to thinking and conduct that promotes social, 
not just personal, freedom, growth, and happiness. For Dewey, the empathetic 
imagination is actually necessary for all inquiry. There are two reasons for this. 
First, our environment is necessarily social and cultural.  Since inquiry is the pro-
cess of effectively interacting with our environment, all inquiry must take into ac-
count the interests, aims, and actions of other people. Thus, Dewey believed that 
communal inquiry was always superior to individual inquiry because it leads to 
knowledge that integrates diverse perspectives and that has been tested in a wider 
field of experience. Such knowledge is more objective and more likely to be effec-
tive (Dewey, 1938, pp. 45-46). Second, like Lev Vygotsky (1978), Dewey argued that 
thinking has its origins in dialogue. He described thinking as the internalization 
of the processes that characterize social interaction, stating that “soliloquy is the 
product and reflex of converse with others; social communication not an effect of 
soliloquy. If we had not talked with others and they with us, we should never talk 
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to and with ourselves . . . Thus mind emerges.” (1958b, p. 170).  When we think, we 
criticize and defend our own ideas the way we would if we were engaged in dialogue 
with a critical other.  If communal inquiry is always the superior mode of thinking 
and thinking itself originates in social interaction, the empathetic imagination is 
essential for all thinking.   
Unlike Plato, then, Dewey does not conceive of the imagination as something 
opposed to thinking, reasoning, knowledge, or reality. According to Dewey, the 
imagination enables us not only to understand reality, but also transform it so that 
it is more conducive to individual and social growth and flourishing. The imagina-
tion also enables us to imagine ourselves as other than we currently are and thus 
to transform ourselves so that we can interact with our environment in a more 
harmonious manner. Consequently, this notion of imagination is also essential for 
autonomy and personal happiness.   
The Imagination in Traditional Education
Traditional schooling tends to discourage the intelligent imagination by presenting 
students with facts as if they are settled, unproblematic, and ready to be memorized. 
There is an underlying assumption that the aim of schooling is to help students 
adapt to a fixed environment and that growth and education has some final end 
point. As David Kennedy explains, this results in a “failure to develop initiative in 
coping with novel situations” and an “undue emphasis upon drill and other devices 
which secure automatic skill at the expense of personal perception” (2006). As we 
have seen, the intelligent imagination is initiated by the need to clarify perplexities, 
control contingencies, and reconstruct oneself and one’s environment. If everything 
appears certain, absolute, unproblematic, and complete, then there is no reason for 
students to imagine things as other than they are. As Dewey explains, “The feeling 
that instruction in ‘facts, facts’ produces a narrow Gradgrind is justified not because 
facts in themselves are limiting, but because facts are dealt out as such hard and 
fast ready-made articles as to leave no room to imagination” (1997, pp. 223-224).  
While this type of schooling is often considered “old-fashioned” and has been 
extensively criticized, it is still widely practiced and defended.  For example, it is 
reflected in the “return to basics” and “core knowledge” ideologies. These ideolo-
gies emphasize all students learning the same prescribed content and skills, with 
a focus on students accumulating facts (e.g., Quirk, 2005; Hirsch, 1987). Maxine 
Greene argues that such traditional notions of schooling are seen as antidotes to 
the seemingly unstable and unpredictable nature of modern life, which is charac-
terized by rapid technological advancements, easy access to masses of often con-
tradictory information, and increasingly globalized and multicultural communi-
ties. The stability of basic, core knowledge and skills is seen as more desirable than 
fostering the imagination, which only seems to encourage further instability and 
complexity:  “In response to school changes, many parents yearn not merely for the 
predictable but also for the assurances that used to accompany children’s mastery 
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of the basics. Talk of tapping hitherto untapped possibilities and exploring unex-
plored alternatives serves to intensify the unease of those who want perhaps most 
of all to recover the simpler world of a time long past” (Greene, 1995, p. 18). Ken-
nedy has a similar perspective on traditional schooling, stating “there are induced 
lack of interest in the novel, aversion to progress, and dread of the uncertain and 
the unknown” (2006, para. 18).  
Traditional educational ideas are also reflected in what John McNeil (2009) 
calls the systematic approach to curriculum. This approach stresses efficiency and 
accountability through government mandated curriculum; the rigid alignment 
of stated learning outcomes with curriculum content, pedagogy, and assessment, 
and it usually involves high stakes testing. The systematic approach is currently be-
ing applied in many Western nations, including Australia, the United States, and 
England, and it has also been widely criticized (see McNeil, 2009; Lingard, 2009; 
Berliner, 2009; Kelly, 2009; Nussbaum, 2010). It tends to result in schooling that is 
teacher centered, content heavy, and predictable, with many teachers simply “teach-
ing to the test.” Complex capacities like critical thinking and imagination are side-
lined as the curriculum is narrowed to focus on skills and content that can be easily 
assessed in standardized tests, such as basic literacy and numeracy skills and the 
recall of facts. The most efficient way to prepare students for such tests is through 
rote learning and drill. Egan argues that the current dominance of the systematic 
approach to schooling is inimical to fostering the imagination: 
In general, imagination has not fared well as might have been expected in 
educational writings about the design of curricula, teaching methods, and 
studies of student’s learning. It seems to have become sidelined by agendas 
that are more urgent, that seek specific social objectives from teaching, and 
that focus on efficiency and accountability. From the perspectives of those 
who have encouraged and directed this general movement in public educa-
tion, imagination seems something of a frill; containing value, no doubt, 
but a value left to the “arts” rather than to the more central purposes of a 
public system that is paid for by people who often have objectives for their 
investment that are more specific. (2007, pp. 3-4)  
Not only is the imagination often “left to the arts,” the arts themselves are sidelined. 
David Berliner has argued that this approach to schooling leads to a decrease in the 
amount of time devoted to the arts so that teachers can focus on teaching the skills 
and knowledge that are assessed on high stakes tests (2009; see also Nussbaum, 
2010).  The time demands of the systematic model additionally discourages the 
teacher’s imagination, which in turn reduces the likelihood of students engaging 
in imaginative learning experiences. One teacher quoted by Michael Apple stated, 
“I just want to get this done: I don’t have time to be creative or imaginative” (2009, 
p. 206). As Apple explains, “we should not blame the teacher here.  In mathematics, 
for example, teachers typically had to spend half the allotted time correcting and 
recording the worksheets the students completed each day” (2009, p. 206).
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As Egan states above, when schools do aim to foster the imagination, it is 
often through the arts. Greene argues that the arts have a unique ability to foster 
the imagination because works of art go beyond immediate experience and evoke 
alternative and multiple versions of reality: 
It is because I believe that encounters with the arts can awaken us to alter-
native possibilities of existing, of being human, of relating to—others, of 
being other, that I argue for their centrality in curriculum. I believe they 
can open new perspectives on what is assumed to be ‘reality,’ that they can 
defamiliarize what has become so familiar it has stopped us from asking 
questions or protesting or taking—action to repair. (1993, p. 214)
While I agree that the arts do have a unique ability to foster the imagination and 
that they should be given greater importance in the curriculum, the problem with 
focusing narrowly on the arts as a means to fostering the imagination is that this 
can reinforce the view that the imagination is distinct from reason and that it is 
not relevant to subjects like maths and science. We don’t want the imagination to 
be seen as something peculiar to the arts. Nor do we want the arts to be seen as 
opposed to reason because they emphasize the imagination. As Nussbaum argues, 
“[students] need to see an imaginative dimension in all their interactions, and to 
see works of art as just one domain in which imagination is cultivated” (2010, p. 
103). Dewey believed that all academic disciplines “are full of matters that must be 
imaginatively realized if they are realized at all” (Dewey, 1997, pp. 223-224). Schools 
must help students see that all good thinking, whether it be in science, art, or physi-
cal education, is imaginative. Philosophy may assist schools in achieving this goal. 
Fostering the Imagination through Philosophy in Schools
Like the arts, philosophy has a special ability to incite the intelligent imagination. 
Philosophy problematizes the taken for granted aspects of everyday experience 
and, as such, it provokes the consideration of alternative possible ways of being in 
the world. Philosophy involves questioning, wondering, criticizing, and going be-
neath the surface of what is immediately given. Unlike the closed questioning that 
characterizes traditional schooling, philosophical questions don’t presuppose one 
correct, fixed answer. Philosophical questions are often open ended and may have 
many answers which are likely to be contentious, open to criticism, and lead to fur-
ther questions. Thus, philosophical questions open up a space for the imaginative 
consideration of alternative possibilities.  Philosophy is also unique in that it draws 
out the problematic, contentious, and imaginative aspects of other disciplines. Other 
school subjects often take it for granted that truth, freewill, justice, democracy, and 
beauty exist, and they even make uncritical assumptions about what such concepts 
mean. In contrast, philosophy assumes that such concepts are contentious, and so 
much philosophical inquiry is devoted to exploring and defining them. Because 
such concepts are so fundamental to all our experiences and understandings, philo-
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sophical inquiry can provoke us to imaginatively reflect on every aspect of our lives. 
Teachers of other subjects frequently told me, a high school philosophy teacher, that 
my philosophy students were constantly bringing up philosophical issues in their 
classes. While some teachers appreciated the depth of understanding and critical 
attitude that these students were displaying, some also seemed to find it frustrat-
ing because they wanted the students to stop complicating the content so that they 
could move through the curriculum more efficiently. Philosophy’s introduction 
into the curriculum may help foster the imagination in all subject areas and disrupt 
schooling focused on the efficient accumulation of facts. 
The seemingly abstract and often idealistic nature of philosophical sub-
ject matter also excites the imagination. Philosophers have relied heavily upon 
imaginative devices like metaphors, similes, analogies, allegories, hypotheticals, 
thought experiments, and fictional narratives as a means of exploring and clarify-
ing philosophical problems and ideas. Such devices are useful for clarifying and 
reinforcing the relationship between the seemingly abstract problems and ideas 
of philosophy and our concrete experiences. One well known example of this is 
Derek Parfit’s teletransporter. Parfit asks us to imagine using a teletransporter to 
travel to Mars at the speed of light as a way of getting us to think about the nature 
of personal identity: 
When I press the button, I shall lose consciousness, and then wake up at 
what seems a moment later. In fact I shall have been unconscious for what 
seems like about an hour. The scanner here on earth will destroy my brain 
and body, while recording the exact states of all my cells. It will then trans-
mit the information by radio. Travelling at the speed of light, the message 
will take three minutes to reach the Replicator on Mars. This will then 
create, out of new matter, a brain and body exactly like mine. It will be in 
this body that I shall wake up. (Parfit, 1984, p. 199)
 This scenario prompts us to consider whether the replica would be identical to the 
person who got in the teletransporter or if it would be a new person. Such fictional 
scenarios can help us draw out the implications and significance of complex meta-
physical problems and theories for our everyday lives. Metaphorical thinking plays 
an equally important role in philosophy. As we have seen, Plato himself famously 
utilized metaphorical thinking. Plato’s most famous metaphor, the Allegory of the 
Cave, explicates his complex idealist theory of reality and knowledge, while empha-
sizing the fundamental implications this theory has for our everyday experiences. 
Furthermore, many philosophical theories are normative rather than descriptive. As 
such, they outline ideals that may not currently exist. When there are no concrete 
examples of normative ideas, philosophers often rely on metaphorical thinking, 
stories, or hypotheticals to explain and evaluate such ideas (e.g., Williams, 1973). It 
is for such reasons that Parfit states that these imaginary devices can help us clarify 
and develop our understanding of reality (1984, p. 200). Lipman’s Philosophy for 
Children curriculum also relies upon fictional narratives to embed philosophical 
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ideas in stories relevant to the lives of young people. These stories prompt philo-
sophical inquiry that involves students unpacking and creating fictional scenarios, 
hypotheticals, and metaphors as a means of clarifying perplexities and making 
sense of their world (see Hamrick, 1989).
The close relationship between philosophy and the imagination is also im-
plied by the claim that children, who are thought to be naturally imaginative, have 
a natural propensity for philosophy. It is argued that children wonder about the 
seemingly mundane, ask questions of a philosophical nature, and constantly search 
for meaningfulness (Lamb, 2002; Matthews, 1980). The child’s tendency for won-
derment and curiosity seems to result from the fact that they are frequently having 
new experiences but lack the concepts that would help them make sense of those 
experiences. Their thinking has also not been so moulded by dominant cultural 
beliefs and values. The constant stream of new and confusing experiences provokes 
philosophical wonderment, as well as the search for alternative possibilities and 
explanations. It is not surprising that Splitter and Sharp believe their imaginative 
tendency may give children an advantage when it comes to philosophical think-
ing: “When it comes to that aspect of thinking, which is concerned with mean-
ing and understanding—with making sense of something which presents itself as 
puzzling or intriguing—the young child’s ability to imagine new possibilities and 
think creatively may be even more valuable than her mature counterpart’s greater 
experience and linguistic sophistication” (Splitter and Sharp 1995, p. 97).
Thus, integrating philosophy into the curriculum may provide students with 
the opportunity to explore the imaginative dimension of all subject areas and de-
velop their inherent imaginative capabilities. However, not just any approach to 
teaching philosophy will foster the intelligent imagination. Philosophy can be, and 
often is, taught in a didactic, teacher-centered way. Although Dewey’s ideas about 
curriculum and pedagogy state that students should engage in reflective, commu-
nal inquiry, Dewey himself did not consider the benefits of teaching philosophy in 
schools. This is why Martha Nussbaum argues that Dewey’s ideas about teaching 
Socratic critical thinking “are in need of supplementation” (2010, p. 73).  She also 
identifies Lipman’s Philosophy for Children method as a practical framework for 
teachers wanting to foster philosophical thinking (2010, p. 73). P4C uses fictional 
narratives rather than textbooks to actively engage students in philosophical in-
quiry. It is also heavily influenced by Dewey’s ideas and is specifically designed to 
facilitate the creation of Deweyan-style communities of inquiry (Lipman, 2008; 
Cam, 2008; Bleazby, 2011). As such, Philosophy for Children is well designed to 
foster the intelligent imagination in schools.
Fostering the Imagination through Philosophy for Children
Since the aim of a Philosophy for Children class is to meaningfully reconstruct 
philosophically puzzling experiences, imaginative thinking is of fundamental im-
portance. While children may have a natural propensity for imaginativeness, their 
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thinking may also be more fanciful than imaginative at times. Students need to 
be scaffolded to develop the capacity for imagining possibilities and creating ideas 
that have the potential to be realized. This means that students must learn that 
even the imagination is governed by logic (Sigurdardóttir, 2002, p. 38). An idea or 
method that assumes that 1+1=3 or “if A then B, not A, therefore not B” is unlikely 
to be effective at meaningfully reconstructing experience. Since P4C is specifically 
aimed at facilitating reasonableness and incorporates the philosophical subdisci-
pline of logic, it is well equipped to help children create ideas that are imaginative 
rather than just fanciful. In the P4C classroom, children are encouraged, through 
teacher questioning and specially designed activities, to seek and give reasons for 
ideas, search for evidence, consider alternatives, construct criteria to evaluate ideas, 
consider the implications of different ideas, look for examples, construct analogies, 
make generalizations, and so on.  Logic provides children with a language and the 
tools to discuss good and bad inferences.
The communal inquiry structure of the P4C classroom may also scaffold 
the intelligent imagination in that it encourages children to consider alternative 
perspectives. When our ideas are made problematic by the differing or critical 
views of others, we must look beyond what is familiar and search for alternative 
meanings. Furthermore, the corrective potential of others can help us avoid thinking 
that is unrealistic and fanciful as opposed to imaginative. This is why Brynhildur 
Sigurdardóttir states that “four eyes are better than two, and communication 
with other people—listening to different perspectives—seems to be the best way 
to avoid imagination’s dead ends” (2002, p. 34). Imagining with others helps us 
imagine alternative possibilities and ideas that are more objective (in the Deweyan 
sense) because they take into account the needs and interests of others. This limits 
the possibility of students imagining and desiring ends that are unlikely to be 
successfully realized in a social environment. The communal nature of the P4C 
classroom may help facilitate the empathetic imagination, which can enable students 
to imagine socially reconstructive ideas. 
Philosophy for Children also emphasizes fallibilism, self-correction, and 
open-mindedness. These attitudes and abilities all depend on the capacity for imag-
ination. The greater one’s capacity for imagination, the less likely one is to fear 
changes, difference, or problems. This is because imaginative people know that if 
a new experience or idea problematizes their beliefs, they will be able to respond 
by imaginatively creating new understandings. As such, imaginative people are 
less likely to feel despair or be defensive and dogmatic when their beliefs are chal-
lenged. Consequently, they are more likely to be open to alternative perspectives 
and new experiences and be more likely to self-correct. They are more likely to see 
problems and alternatives as opportunities for imaginatively recreating current 
beliefs and gaining new knowledge. This is suggested by Lipman’s description of 
creative thinkers: “The merely critical thinker is somehow conservative, in the sense 
that he or she is not content until finding a belief that dispenses with thinking. On 
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the other hand, the creative thinker is essentially sceptical and radical. Creative 
thinkers are never so happy as when they have been let loose, like bulls in china 
shops, to smash to smithereens the bric-a-brac of the world” (2003, p. 254). Thus, 
the open-minded, self-corrective and flexible thinking that P4C aims to facilitate 
is essentially imaginative thinking. 
Another one of P4C’s fundamental goals is to facilitate autonomy or the ca-
pacity to think for oneself (Lipman, 2003; Splitter & Sharp, 1995).  Independent 
thinking and autonomy also involve the intelligent imagination, which enables in-
dividuals to imagine things differently from how other people perceive them, and 
to dominant social values and practices. It is also through the intelligent imagina-
tion that individuals transform and influence their social-cultural environment in 
accordance with their own ideals. Thus, without the imagination one would simply 
have to follow the crowd and accept the status quo, even if one found it oppressive 
or undesirable. For marginalized groups, including children and young people, the 
imagination may be particularly important. Their interests and experiences may be 
those least reflected in dominant values and knowledge. The imagination enables 
young people to create and express ideas that are not entirely constrained by adult 
understandings. The intelligent imagination also enables us to transform ourselves 
in accordance with our personal goals or ideals. By helping students imagine reason-
able ideas and possibilities, P4C can help students set realistic and attainable goals 
for themselves and construct effective means for attaining them. As Degenhardt 
and McKay explain, a lack of autonomy often results from individuals setting goals 
that are unrealistic or ill conceived:  
In envisaging future developments in our lives, in trying to foresee cho-
sen activities and commitments, it is easy to focus on and exaggerate the 
rewards of a particular life-style. We may then become disillusioned and 
even bitter when we encounter the realities of such a life-style and our 
own aptitude for participating in it. This could have been avoided if our 
initial imaginings had been fuller, more disciplined, and better informed. 
(1988, p. 253)
Conclusion
In conclusion, the teaching of philosophy in schools, especially in accordance with 
the Philosophy for Children pedagogy and curriculum, can enable schools to fos-
ter Dewey’s fruitful notion of intelligent imagination. This is because philosophy 
and Philosophy for Children emphasize the problematic, idealism, community, 
reasonableness, autonomy, open-mindedness, fallibilism, and the search for mean-
ingfulness. This contrasts with traditional schooling which reflects Plato’s concern 
that the imagination may lead us away from truth, understanding, and happiness. 
Traditional schools discourage the imagination by focusing on the accumulation 
of “acts” and the mastery of basic skills. If, as Dewey states, the aim and the means 
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of education are growth, without the capacity for intelligent imagination, which 
is the ability to meaningfully transform oneself and one’s world, one could not be 
educated. This is why Greene states that “a kindred imaginative ability is required 
if the becoming different that learning involves is actually to take place” (1995, p. 
22). As such, the teaching of philosophy through engaging students in philosophi-
cal communities of inquiry should be central to all learning. 
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